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ABSTRACT 
On 2 December 2005, a government-enforced Agreement to reduce Interchange levels for 
a five-year period (2006-2010) was signed by the main Spanish merchant associations 
and card schemes1. The main results of the mandated Agreement have disturbed the 
necessary balance of the electronic payment system market and have damaged the 
majority of participants and society as a whole. The reduction in interchange fees was 
3,329.96 million euros by the end of 2010. Although statistical correlations can never prove 
causality, and can be attributed to several factors involved, the average annual decline of 
more than 830 million has harmed consumers by raising cardholder fees and reducing 
card benefits, without any improvement of services being taken into account. But to 
different extents this is also true for the acquiring and issuing banks, which have been 
forced to protect themselves against loss of income, and even for merchants and card 
schemes which signed the Agreement. There is no evidence that prices have been 
lowered or the fulfilment of other objectives of the Agreement. This has altered the four-
party system, which favours other less participatory systems and reduces incentives to 
innovate to improve the quality and safety of the service. In addition, it has also slowed the 
replacement of cash, which is more expensive and slower, less efficient and less 
transparent. This has benefitted the black economy, not income tax revenue or general 
welfare. As such, the main incentives to boost electronic payments as instruments of 
innovation, transparency and cost reduction have suffered. Nor has there been an 
increase in trade volumes, which have also been affected by the crisis and the increase in 
defaults, which has led to higher commissions. 
 
1 Introduction: objectives and methods 
The copious literature on methods of payment presents a lack of clarity and transparency 
all over the world, but above all in Spain. It would be reasonable to expect a more detailed 
specification of the costs and benefits of something so basic to the economic system. 
However, almost all these studies lack quantitative data, despite the numerous relevant 
public interventions all over the world and endless debates, theories, scientific papers and 
doctoral theses. Dealing with this deficiency is the main objective of this quantitative study 
to measure the effects of administrative intervention. 
 
The European Commission, for example, has spent almost a decade reducing cross-
border interchange fees. At the same time, numerous member states, among them Spain, 
have taken measures regarding merchant service charge (MSC) and interchange fees. 
Rules have sometimes been agreed upon after long public debates. But these have never 
been accompanied by corresponding reports on benefits and costs, despite the affect on 
the interests of consumers, trade and the issuing or acquiring credit card entities. Nor have 
rigorous and thorough evaluations of the anticipated results for the economy and society 
as a whole been carried out. 
 
There is one exception – a study realized in Australia in 20082  – and it is on this that we 
base our quantitative methods and scientific objectives. We also consider and compare 
official and unofficial statistics, in addition to carrying out both quantitative and qualitative 
surveys with consumers, merchants and banks. We have found extensive gaps in the 
statistics and data. Together with our findings, some of the unanswered questions have 
                                                        
1
 Merchant associations: ANGED, FEH, FEHR and CAAVE Schemes: Servired, 4B and Euro 6000 
2
 Stillman Robert, William Bishop, Kyla Malcolm and Nicole Hidebrandt, Regulatory Intervention in the Payment Card Industry by the Reserve 
Bank of Australia. Analysis and evidence”. CRA International. London, (2008): April 28. 
The effects of the mandatory decrease of interchange fees in Spain 
 
 4 
led to announcements of improvements in information, amplification of the indicators 
employed and greater and more frequent publicising of the results.  
 
2 The reality of payment systems worldwide and in Spain 
The economic literature generally characterizes the payment card sector as a two-sided 
market. The term originates in the fact that operators (above all, banks, and now 
telecommunications and Internet companies) use technological platforms to sell services 
to two types of client3: 
 
a) Consumers or cardholders. These may purchase goods or services from those 
merchants accepting cards, or remove money from cash points. 
 
b) Merchants, who allow cardholders to pay with cards through point of sale 
terminals (POS terminals), dataphones and now smartphones. 
 
In any case, the two-sided payment card market presents different business models:  
systems of two, three and four parties. The most common are the ones with most parties 
(four-party systems): Visa or MasterCard bank cards (as well as the majority of national 
networks), since on the one hand banks and consumers participate, and on the other there 
are other acquiring banks and merchants. The banks use networks, such as – in the case 
of Spain - Servired, Sistema 4B and Euro 6000.  
 
In the three-party system a commercial company lends its services directly to consumers 
and merchants (American Express and Diners Club4. In two-party systems only consumers 
and merchants are involved; merchants issue their own cards, known as private cards. 
These represent almost a quarter of the total number of payment cards in Spain, with 1% - 
2% represented by three-party cards (mainly American Express); the remainder are bank 
cards5, which are unique in that they publish official statistics about number, transactions 
and fees6. 
 
Four-party systems involve both debit cards (the majority and fastest growing) as well as 
credit cards. With each commercial transaction, the issuer (in name of the cardholder) 
pays the acquirer (in name of the merchant) for the value of the service of the product 
purchased. 
 
These services, which are much faster and more convenient for society in general than 
cash, require two kinds of revenue to maintain and improve their quality. One is provided 
by commissions paid to the issuing bank or acquiring bank in exchange for their services 
by customers or merchants; for example, annual fees to maintain cards and POS 
terminals. The other is the merchant service charge7 paid by the merchant to the acquiring 
                                                        
3
 Börestam, Ann, and Heiko Schmiedel, Interchange fees in card payments. Occasional paper series Nº 131, European Central Bank, 
September 2011, p. 10.  
4
 While in the four-party scheme the issuer has a contractual relationship with the cardholder and the acquirer has the same with the merchant, 
in the three-party model the network acts as issuer and acquirer and has a direct contractual relationship with the cardholder and the 
merchant; one variant of this is the three-party model which also allows other payment service providers to obtain an issuing and/or acquisition 
license (so-called "three-party schemes with licensees”) according to the ECB's own definitions. Among the three-party networks operating in 
the EU are included American Express and Diners Club, while four-party networks include Visa Europe, MasterCard and most of the national 
networks. It should be noted that three-party schemes are fundamentally three-party credit card networks, while four-party schemes are both 
debit and credit card networks. The larger member states still have at least one national card network that only allows domestic payments. 
This is the case, for example, of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy and Portugal. 
5
 DBK: Competitors: tarjetas de pago, 2007. http://www.dbk.es/esp/default.cfm?CFID=11313976&CFTOKEN=58742134 
6
 http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/sispago/sispago.html 
7
 In the European economic literature this is called a “merchant service charge” (MSC) and in the American literature, the “discount fee” (DF). 
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entity as a percentage of the final price of the purchase for providing the merchant with the 
means of payment and to provide an advance to cover the days, weeks or months it takes 
the consumer to pay. 
 
A significant part of the merchant service charge goes towards dealing with amounts that 
the acquiring bank transfers to the issuer for collaborating in the service. This 
compensation is known as the interchange fee. 
 
Figure 1. Movements in four-party payment systems 
No table of figures entries found. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consequently, the interchange fee is used to balance the assumption of costs of the 
means of payment between acquiring and issuing banks. Thus it functions to balance the 
demand on both sides of the market. As a result, all parties and society as a whole obtain 
the benefits of this payment method and the indirect network effects8, among which are the 
optimisation of the use of the cards and their acceptance9. 
 
Interchange fees are usually the result of general agreements reached between parties. 
As these rates are very dependent on local markets, in the absence of or difficulty in 
reaching agreements, they are fixed by brand owners such as Visa or MasterCard. Some 
competition authorities have called into question this open-market method, suggesting it 
should be entrusted to state regulators. However, since in three-party systems brands 
such as American Express or Diners Club have a double role as both issuers and 
acquirers, any agreement is unnecessary and, as such, competition rules do not apply 
even though rates are generally much higher. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
8
 The greater the number of consumers who use cards, the greater will be their acceptance by merchants, while the greater the number of 
merchants who accept cards, the more useful such cards will be perceived by consumers. Network effects arise when the value of forming a 
part of the network varies depending on the size of the network, Such effects are known as “indirect network effects”. See the study of CRA 
International Regulatory intervention in the payment card industry by the Reserve Bank of Australia. 28 April 2008, pp. 61. 
9
 Evans, David, and Schmalensee, Richard, The Economics of Interchange Fees and Their Regulation: An Overview, AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies, Related Publication 05-12, May 2005, and Wright, Julian, The determinants of optimal interchange fees in 
payment systems, Journal of Industrial Economics Vol. 52, Issue 1 (March 2004), pp. 1-26.  
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3 Fees and the future of payments in the economic literature 
Interchange fees and the present and future of electronic methods of payment have been 
the focus of an intensive but rather long-winded investigation in the literature by academics 
and independent economists or those connected with regulatory bodies, supervising 
banks, competition authorities, consultants and representatives of each of the parties 
involved. We have examined several hundred texts and have found that the main themes 
cover approximately thirty main aspects discussed by more than fifty prestigious authors 
(judging by the number of academic citations). 
 
The economic literature demonstrates a broad consensus regarding the reasons why 
interchange fees effectively work in the four-party payment system. However, this is not 
the case with reference to the ideal assignation of costs and benefits, nor with reference to 
the possible economic effects of the restrictions introduced by administrative constraints. 
The debate has increased as attempts to reduce interchange fees have spread, recently in 
the United States and other countries, where they are higher than in Spain and Europe. 
Discussions about which payment method is economical and socially ideal tend to favour 
electronic money, even while a consensus is growing concerning the need to bolster the 
empirical evidence, as we are attempting to do here. 
 
The majority of these articles have been published within the last decade, above all during 
the period 2003-2006. Thirty or so countries and intergovernmental bodies, such as the 
European Commission, have established regulatory measures10, the majority of which 
have been restrictive for interchange fees and cards. Others, however, such as Argentina 
or South Korea, have promoted these measures as a way of avoiding or reducing fraud or 
tax revenues, and to increase the transparency of cards compared to cash. 
 
The most important issues dealt with concern competition, the extent of the role of the 
market in optimizing the system, the characteristics and benefits of the system (the main 
focus of this investigation into the case of Spain), the bilateral or multilateral fixing of the 
interchange fees, the multiple benefits and costs of regulation (the quantitative instrument 
used in our research), the effects of innovation and technology in the formation of 
networks and two-sided markets, the comparison of costs and advantages of each of the 
methods of payment, and if the market incentives which bring about the substitution of 
cash by electronic money should or should not be reinforced by Public Administrations – 
an important issue which, like others, is outside the scope of this research, which focuses 
on the causes and effects of the reduction in interchange fees in Spain as a response to 
accusations concerning rules of competition. 
 
3.1 The problem of competition in the search for optimums  
Since the 1970s there has been an intense controversy about whether interchange fees 
and their transfer to MSC violates fair competition, and also concerning market 
inefficiencies in assigning resources, which is what is usually used to justify the 
intervention of competition and regulatory authorities. These inefficiencies refer to the use 
or abuse of a method of payment in reference to its social cost. Paradoxically, a growing 
body of literature indicates that electronic payments are cheaper than cash; this is 
suggested by a dozen studies published in the last ten years in Europe 11 . But the 
monopoly on the issuance of cash is not subject to intervention or competition rules, 
                                                        
10
 These measures are discussed in Appendix 2 of this report, also available from the authors on request. 
11
 Dot.econ, Costly cash, International evidence on cost of making payments, Sept 2011. 
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despite the persistent criticisms of certain schools of economics, such as the Austrian. 
Such actions center on cards and four-party payment systems, not on those of two or 
three parties. 
 
The first country establishing regulatory controls of interchange fees was Norway in 1989. 
But the most well known and influential interventions were carried in Australia, although 
this was done later than those in Spain. A study by the Payments System Board of the 
Reserve Bank of Australia concluded that interchange fees were too high and did not 
conform to the rules of competition. Consequently, Visa and MasterCard were forced in 
2000 to eliminate their no-discrimination rule (NDR) 12 and reduce their interchange fees. 
Many authors, such as for example Evans et al (2011)13, have said that there is no clear 
theoretical basis for such measures, including the further proposed reduction of 
interchange fees in the U.S. (Federal Reserve System, 2010)14. They conclude that in 
these cases administrative intervention is not justified: "It neither identifies clearly that 
there is a market failure, nor considers the almost unanimous position in the economic 
literature that rules based solely on the concept of "cost” are not justified, nor guarantees 
that the outcome of the standard will benefit consumers." 
 
Most of the literature on public interventions regarding reducing interchange fees focuses 
too much on the price of services, as noted by Bradford and Hayashi (2008)15. The most 
reasonable approach for many academics would be to achieve a more efficient structure 
for society of all commissions, not just reduce one or the other, to transfer the benefits to 
the final consumers, as indicated by Evans, Litan y Schmalensee (2011)16, the previously 
cited report of the Federal Reserve System (2010), or, earlier, Stillman et al (2008)17. 
 
This is because there is a consensus among economic theorists that it is impossible, 
except by chance, to reach the socially optimal interchange fees through any regulatory 
system that considers only costs. While some studies suggest that privately set 
interchange fees end up being inefficiently high, others conclude that they end up 
inefficiently low. But the truth is that there is no theoretical or empirical basis for concluding 
that it is possible to improve social welfare by the significant reduction in interchange fees, 
as Evans and Schmalensee conclude (2005)18, so that it is for the regulatory authorities to 
bear the burden of proof regarding supposed market imperfections and demonstrate that 
regulation can lead to an improvement in social welfare. 
 
In summary, there are five solutions given by public authorities to this "theoretical" problem 
of competition, according to Prager et al (2009): 1) Remove confusing restrictions on price 
differentiation of each payment method to reflect true costs and benefits; 2) Submit 
interchange fees to multilateral negotiation - which is not so simple, since when it has been 
                                                        
12
 Known in the literature as the “no-discrimination rule” (NDR), it prohibits merchants from surcharging payment by credit cards over other 
payment methods to try to recover the costs of the discount rate. 
13
 Evans, David S., Litan, Robert E., Schmalensee, Richard, The Economic Principles for Establishing Reasonable Regulation of Debit- Card 
Interchange Fees that Could Improve Consumer Welfare. Submission to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February 22, 
2011. 
14
 Federal Reserve System.12 CFR Part 235 Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing. Proposed Rules. [Regulation II; Docket No. R–1404]. 
RIN 7100–AD63.  Federal Register. Vol. 75, No. 248. 2010. 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/meetings/2010/20101216/20101216_InterchangeFeeProposedRuleDRAFTFRNotice.pdf 
15
 Bradford, Terri, and Hayashi, Fumiko, Developments in interchange fees in the United States and abroad, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City, April 2008 http://www.kansascityfed.org/Publicat/PSR/Briefings/PSR-BriefingApr08.pdf 
16
 Evans, David S.,  Litan, Robert E. y Schmalensee, Richard, The Economic Principles for Establishing Reasonable Regulation of Debit-Card 
Interchange Fees that Could Improve Consumer Welfare ,February 22, 2011. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1769890  o 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1769890 
17
Stillman, Robert; William Bishop, Robert; Malcol, Kyla and Hidebrandt Nicole, Regulatory Intervention in the Payment Card Industry by the 
Reserve Bank of Australia. Analysis and evidence. CRA International. London, (2008) April 28. 
18
 Evans, David S. and Schmalensee, Richard , The Economics of Interchange Fees and Their Regulation: An Overview, MIT Sloan, 
Documento de Trabajo N º 4548-05 
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attempted, ultimately one position has been imposed, as seems to be the case in Spain; 3) 
Adjust the level of interchange fees to optimize overall system efficiency, although they are 
only one part of the system and there is no guarantee that the reduction of fees will be 
instrumental in maintaining an optimum balance among all, as pointed out by Calvano 
(2011)19: "relevant economic literature does not support the premise of only reducing  
interchange fees by merely arguing costs; 4) Relax card approval rules, for example to 
limit the application of the "honour-all-cards rule", forcing merchants using a network to 
accept all cards issued by the network, and; 5) Do nothing, especially if it is not entirely 
clear that the market allocates resources inefficiently. 
 
Which is preferable? It is not enough to consider which is the most efficient option for each 
party; the interests of all parties must be taken into account. Finding the optimum involves 
comparing both costs and benefits for the individual and for the society as a whole. But 
academic economists and regulators do not even agree on whether current models are 
socially optimal.  
 
Consequently, the discussion of theoretical models centers around two key issues, which 
can be summarized as: how to ensure efficiency without affecting free competition. There 
is broad consensus that less public intervention and an increase in transparency in pricing 
schemes contribute substantially to the efficiency of payment systems, helped by product 
innovation. 
 
3.2 The two-sidedness of the market and how to fix interchange fees 
The theoretical literature with most impact in the debate on competition discusses, among 
other things, two-sided markets, defined by Rochet and Tirole (2004)20 as those where 
there are two conditions: 1) the price structure or balance (the fee that each user pays in 
the end) affects the total volume of transactions, and 2) end-users are unable to negotiate 
prices based on costs of participating in the platform. Hence, the socially optimal structure 
would be the one that maximizes the total of the surplus of the consumer, the merchant 
and the bank. 
 
This characterization of the card market as two-sided involves two types of challenges. 
One is clearly positive: the increasing decline in transaction costs related to the benefits 
derived from innovations introduced by information technology and digital communications 
and their reduced temporal and spatial barriers, positive network externalities (value 
delivered grows with the number of users) or other effects and regularities of the new 
knowledge-driven information economy 21 , which with the digital revolution is gaining 
ground over the traditional economics of materials moved by energy. The second 
challenge is negative, as when the discussion of these markets is linked to competition 
and other complex issues such as income transfers between agents or cross-subsidies22. 
The reason is that two-sided markets foster an asymmetric distribution of costs and 
earnings: one party pays less than the other or, in extreme cases, nothing. Paradoxically, 
the bias toward that significant asymmetry is often attributed to positive network 
externalities (Evans and Schmalensee, 2005)23. 
                                                        
19
 Calvano, Emilio , Note on the Economic Theory of Interchange,  Economic Theory of Interchange Fees. Comment Submitted to the Federal 
Reserve Board Regarding the Implementation of the Durbin Amendment. February 22, .2011. 
20
 Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Tirole, Jean, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, Rand Journal of Economics 37 (3), 645-667, 2006, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00036.x/abstract 
21
 Terceiro, José B. and Matías, Gustavo: Digitalismo, Tauros 2001, Madrid. 
22
 In Appendix 1 can be found the classification of topics and names of authors and works, preceded by the number of citations in academic 
journals, including web links. 
23
 Evans, David S. and Richard Schmalensee, The Economics of Interchange Fees and Their Regulation: An Overview, MIT Sloan, 
Documento de Trabajo N º 4548-05  
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Among the most outstanding authors in our rankings24 can be included, along with Rochet 
and Tirole (their 2006 article has received five hundred citations and those of 2003 and 
2010 nearly a thousand each), Wright (2004, one hundred and fifty citations), Armstrong 
(2006, 893 citations), Schmalensee (2001, 244 citations). Many of these articles are 
founded on the contributions made several decades ago by Baxter (1983), a pioneer in 
justifying the need for interchange fees. The role he assigns to them is to address market 
failures caused by externalities (such as "shoe leather costs" that payment cards save), 
since these rates have the potential to align benefits and social costs. Although Baxter’s 
model has been criticized for being based on simplistic assumptions such as the 
homogeneity of consumers and merchants, today it remains one of the most cited articles 
in books and journals: cited 263 times as of November 2011 according to Google Scholar. 
 
For most analyses, the key is precisely that the two-sidedness of the market prevents 
strategic interaction – not of the acquiring or issuing bank with consumers and merchants, 
but between the different interests of the latter two parties, key players in retail trade. The 
most important authors who reject that strategic interaction are Rochet and Tirole (2006) 25 
- this is one of the most cited works in the academic literature (506 times cited, and the 
supplement of 2010 around a thousand more) - and Verdier (2009)26, in one of the most 
prestigious overviews published. Before this Wright (2001)27 had stated that, despite the 
known heterogeneity of interests, the volume of payments would be maximized as the 
demand of both parties reached a balance. This paper has been cited in the academic 
literature 150 times, a figure only exceeded by that of Schmalensee’s 2001 paper (244 
citations)28 , with reference to similar issues and the dynamics of price discrimination. 
Schmalensee rejected the existence of an economic basis for proprietary systems that do 
not balance their interests with interchange fees (two-party and three-party systems).  
 
Another of the deficiencies ascribed to the economic models of interchange fees affects 
the strategic interaction between merchants. As there is competition among them to attract 
customers, in principle this encourages them to accept cards and even accept higher 
rates, as recognized for example by Vickers (2005) and Rochet and Tirole (2008). The 
subsequent problem is an increase in the total net cost: competition forces unwelcome 
choices for some market participants. The truth is that the statistics indicate that large 
merchants have the lowest interchange fees. 
 
No less important are the debates in the literature about whether interchange fees should 
be set on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Even from the majority view that the exchange 
between value achieved by consumers and merchants should cope with heterogeneous 
markets and avoid situations of underuse or overuse, it is recognized that it is not the 
same maximizing profits, fees or welfare. This is what theorists cited several hundred 
times in the academic literature recognize (such as Schmalensee (2001), Wright (2004), 
                                                        
24
 Appendix 1 summarizes the controversy over two-sided markets dealt with in several hundred articles dealing with thirty aspects of the 
issue. 
25
 Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Tirole, Jean, Two-sided markets: a progress report, The RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 37, Issue 3, 
pages 645–667, September 2006, supplemented by PLATFORM COMPETITION IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS, Journal of the European 
Economic Association Volume 1, Issue 4, article first published online: 13 DEC 2010. 
26
 Verdier, Marianne, Interchange fees in payment card systems: a survey of the literature, Journal of Economic Surveys, Volume 25, Issue 2, 
pages 273–297, April 2011. 
27
 Wright, Julien,The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems, Economics Working Papers, University of Auckland, 
j.wright@auckland.ac.nz 
28
 Schmalensee, Richard, Payment Systems and Interchange Fees, NBER Working Paper No. 8256, Issued in April 2001,NBER 
Program(s):IO ; Payment Systems And Interchange Fees,  Journal of Industrial Economics, 2002, v50 (2 June), 103-122. Paper available as 
PDF (206 K) in http://www.nber.org/papers/w8256 
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and Rochet and Tirole (2006)). They also address other problems associated with the 
abovementioned issues, such as forms of negotiation, price discrimination and optimums. 
 
But most of the theoretical models have not been subject to empirical tests, even those 
which urge the benefits of reducing interchange fees at all costs, irrespective of possible 
consequences. Moreover, even taking into account the different costs for different 
methods of payment, they differ in approaches and definitions used, particularly in the face 
of the more general but interesting problem related to the optimizing of payment systems: 
the substitution of cash by electronic money, as we will see later (although this is not the 
objective of this research). 
 
3.3 The replacement of cash by electronic money 
As controversial as the above is the question of whether the lowering of interchange fees 
would help consumers and merchants to decide whether to use cash more or less29. The 
discussion is connected with the above because electronic methods of payment approach 
the social optimum: they have proven to be cheaper, more efficient, more transparent, 
more convenient, innovative, and so on. But we have already said that the decision maker 
focuses on his own interests and not the collective interest, and in something as important 
to the economic system as a whole it is not clear how to compare costs of different 
payment methods, especially given the difficulty of estimating the cost of cash, as 
mentioned by Leinonen (2007), and Verdier (2009). 
 
In theory, the substitution of cash is in everyone’s interest, and the reduction in 
interchange fees only to merchants, not banks or consumers, who are the source of the 
payment chain. Almost all the estimates compared by Costly Cash30 show that the greatest 
cost of cash for consumers is in time and travel, and for merchants in fraud and 
manipulation, although fees vary widely between countries since they do not follow the 
same methods. With cards and their technology, bank fees and interchange fees come to 
the fore, although the total cost of electronic payments is reduced to a third of that of cash, 
despite excluding numerous important concepts as has been pointed out.  
 
The imbalance in compensation in the four-party system usually occurs through 
administrative intervention or agreements between parties that do not satisfy some of 
them. These parties then try to recover revenues from other sources, as has happened 
with the rise of bank charges to consumers in different countries and even to merchants to 
compensate for reduced interchange fees and MSC, as evidenced in Australia, Canada31, 
Spain, and now the U.S., and so on, while in other countries merchants charge additional 
fees32 . These reactions are considered in much of the literature as a source of net 
diseconomies for the whole, as well as for those most directly affected by them. 
 
The main reason is that they introduce a brake on the incentives to the changeover from 
cash, and on the optimization of the volume of transactions or the net social benefits of 
payments. But despite this and the increase of the relation between cash/GDP in the 
eurozone after the creation of the euro, electronic payments have grown to a 22% share 
                                                        
29
 Methods or instruments of payment are the devices (electronic cards or mobile phones), documents (bank drafts, checks or bills of 
exchange) that allow the use of bank money (cash and deposits) to pay, without the need for physical money (notes and coins in circulation). 
See www.bde.es Documento completo (3 MB) PDF 
30
 Dot-econ, Costly cash: a synthesis of international evidence on the cost of making payments. 2011. 
31
 Canada reduced interchange fees to zero order of the Competition Bureau, after which Evans, Chang and Weicher (2011) estimated there 
would  be significant increases in the fees charged for use to consumers 
32
 Brits and Winder, Payments are no free lunch, De Nederlandsche Bank. Occasional Studies Vol. 3, No 2, p. 5, observe that an increasing 
number of merchants charge a small fee (0.10 - 0.20 euros) for payment by debit card for purchases under 10 euros. 
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and are now being increased further by mobile phone payments, which take below $10 the 
threshold at which electronic payments are cheaper than cash payments. 
 
In articles on possible trends concerning overutilization or underutilization of payment 
methods (Prager et al, 2009), a widespread idea is that cash will be replaced only if 
consumers and merchants find sufficient incentives. Revealing these incentives is 
precisely the concern of interchange fees in the works of Leinonen (2007), and Verdier 
(2009). 
 
Although by summing the entirety of individual interests we come close to the overall 
interest of society itself, those who decide on one method of payment or another do this 
according to their own perceptions of costs, which are generally subjective and far from 
the overall total cost. Hence, the comparative study between the dozen or so previously 
mentioned European studies simply concludes that electronic money is much cheaper, 
faster and more convenient than cash. But most private economic costs are excluded from 
these measurements because they are considered transfers between economic agents 
(banks, merchants and consumers) and not final costs33; this is the case of interchange 
fees, which are included together with other fees charged by banks and payable by 
merchants and consumers in the classification we have consulted containing a list of 
around thirty costs; others are not assessed due to a lack of statistical information. 
 
Furthermore, these studies do not even consider the benefits of the transparency and 
efficiency of digital money and its impact on income and on public expenditure, so that in 
practice interchange fees are reduced to a fraction of all such costs and benefits, and are 
not even considered part of the whole since they figure as part of revenue transfers 
between agents.  
 
However, interchange fees appear in many other dimensions or theoretical perspectives 
as a factor explaining the recent and future evolution of means of payment, together with 
technological variables, and even have more weight than others that are economic, 
financial, institutional or purely political. 
 
3.4 Quality and other dimensions and outlooks on the debate 
One of these widely discussed issues is the relationship between the level of interchange 
fees and the quality of services paid with them. Verdier (2006 & 2010)34 attempts to define 
an optimum from the question of whether system operators and banks have any interest in 
inflating interchange fees to maximum levels. There is no evidence that this is so in the 
literature. But Verdier’s suggestion is that such an interest in inflating them would not 
necessarily be bad for net social welfare, provided that additional revenues were used to 
recover the higher levels of fixed costs and ensure security and innovation. Thus there 
may be social efficiency in the system, despite the resulting higher interchange fees. 
 
Nevertheless, there is also a consensus regarding both the function of interchange fees in 
generating those higher levels of quality, and that more competition between networks 
facilitates the reduction of interchange fees and, as a result, the MSC, or at least makes 
                                                        
 
33
Of the 30 types of costs classified by the authors in Appendix 3, over a third are excluded from measurement for one reason or another in 
the dozen comparative studies by Dot.econ, Costly cash, 2011 
34
 Verdier , Marianne,  Interchange Fees and Ineficiencies in the Substitution between Payment Cards and Cash, March 29, 2010 
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/conference/2010/econ/IF-cash-cards.pdf 
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their level more acceptable (Bolt and Schmiedel, 2011)35. This is confirmed by many 
recent experiences, especially with the general downward trend in Europe, where 
consumers and merchants can also benefit from the SEPA. 
 
Of course, there are many issues related to these debates, such as, for example, the 
causes of the proliferation of cards, agents and payments, the attitudes of merchants, 
consumers and their sensitivity towards prices, reward schemes and other attempts to 
gain loyalty; the dominant position of mobile operators, card network theories; analysis of 
costs and benefits of the payment method; efficiency, transparency and other positive 
effects; hidden costs and externalities; specificities affecting regulation and competition 
(networks, economic externalities, cross subsidies, price discrimination, and so on);  
incentives to invest and innovate; surcharges; impact on social welfare and credit; other 
economic effects and problems, and of course the presence of many of these issues in the 
regulation of fees by country and zone such as the European Union and Spain. 
 
3.5 The economic literature and interventions in Spain  
The literature on interchange fees and government intervention in Spain shows similar 
characteristics to what is seen internationally, being influenced by regulation in Australia36, 
and debating competition, two-sided markets and substitution, as well as emphasizing the 
theoretical over the empirical. The most outstanding authors, Carbo, Chakravorti and 
Rodriguez Fernandez37 analyzed in 2009 the effect of caps on multilateral interchange 
fees in the period between 1997 and 2007. They concluded that the income of consumers 
and merchants improved when exchange rates were reduced by agreement between the 
parties in conflict. Banking income also increased at the same time, because the increase 
in transactions offset the decline in unit revenues per transaction. But they recognize that 
their results depend on market acceptance, "far from complete initially and during the 
application of maximum fees" and suggest as likely the existence of interchange fees 
below which social welfare decreases. 
 
At the same time, Corral (2009)38 states that it does not seem the increase in fees has 
been particularly important during the period 2007-2008 - with the exception of issuance 
and renewal fees - nor that such an increase is the solution to offset the negative effect of 
the fall in interchange fees. Corral argues, on the contrary, in favour of increasing activity 
and interest income, imitating the Anglo-Saxon model, where in 2007 the balances 
deferred or financed by consumption reached 30%, almost triple the 12.5% of Spain. This 
strategy of focusing future business on income from fees, as is done in the UK, turned out 
to be supported by 97% of the organizations surveyed in our research. In contrast, the 
second hypothesis (that the main beneficiary of lower interchange fees was the final 
consumer) was categorically rejected by 93%: these respondents identified the retailer as 
the main beneficiary, compared to only 2.3% who felt it was the final consumer. 
 
                                                        
35 
Bolt, W. and Schmiedel, H. Pricing of Payment Cards, Competition, and Efﬁciency: A Possible Guide for SEP, Annals of Finance, pp. 1-21, 
cited by Ann Börestam y Heiko Schmiedel, Interchange fees in card payments, occasional paper series, number 131/September 2011, pp. 8 
http://www.ecb.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp131.pdf 
36
 Carbó Valverde, Santiago; Humphrey,  David,  and  López del Paso, Rafael, The Falling Share of Cash Payments in Spain, Moneda y 
Crédito, Revista de Economía, nº 217, 2003, pag 167-190. http://europa.sim.ucm.es/compludoc/AA?articuloId=248822 
37
 Carbó Valverde, Santiago;  Chakravorti, Sujit, and  Rodríguez-Fernandez, Francisco., The Costs and Benefits of Interchange Fee 
Regulation: An Empirical Investigation, FRB de Chicago, Documento de Trabajo N º 2009-11 ( Preliminary version) and Regulating Two-Sided 
Markets: An Empirical Investigation (November 19, 2009). FRB of Chicago Working Paper No. 2009-11. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1511809 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1511809 
38
 Corral de la Mata, Daniel. Nuevo enfoque del negocio de tarjetas bancarias en el sistema español de medios de pago, Facultad de Ciencias 
Jurídicas y Sociales, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos,  Doctoral thesis,  (2009), pp. 141.  
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However, we understand that in tackling this research that neither the period studied by 
the previous research is relevant, nor do the findings coincide with our hypotheses and 
empirical results.  
 
During that period there were two different policies: the PP government in the years from 
1995 to 2004 and the PSOE government from 2004 to 2011. The result of the second 
policy was an agreement to reduce interchange fees in line with the desire of regulators. 
But this agreement, as we shall see, was imposed and neither brought widespread 
benefits nor in the end was able to maintain the increase in transactions, which began to 
decline before the recession began in 2009, indicating that what the economic cycle 
provides it can later take away. 
 
In Spain, the reduction began earlier than in Australia. The framework of the debate was 
the "Commission to study the problems arising from the use of cards as a method of 
payment," (“Comisión de estudio de los problemas derivados de la utilización de tarjetas 
como medio de pago”) established in April 1999. Before this there were various efforts that 
led Congress to urge the Government to create the Commission, assisted by the Secretary 
of State for Commerce (Secretaría de Estado de Comercio). The commissioners were, 
together with the three card schemes and independent experts, trade associations. In face 
of opposition to reduce MSC, it was agreed only to lower interchange fees. These were to 
remain at a maximum of 3.5% from July of that year and each year were to come down 
0.25 points to 2.75% on July 1, 2002, as the Competition Tribunal (El Tribunal de Defensa 
de la Competencia) authorized in April 2000. 
 
With the expiry of this agreement in 2003, when regulation began in Australia, the trade 
associations ANGED, FEH, FEHR and CAAVE denounced the three Spanish card 
networks to the Spanish Office for the Defence of Competition for alleged abuse of the 
MSC. In May of that year, Congress once again urged the Government to adjust 
interchange fees in accordance with the principles accepted by the competition authorities 
of Spain and Europe, objectively, transparently and according to cost by category. 
 
Before the Government acted directly, in April 2003 the Competition Tribunal denied 
authorizations of fees requested in December 2001 by 4B and in April 2002 by Servired, 
while revoking the authorization of Euro6000. It argued that they were not sufficiently 
justified in terms of costs and were the same for debit and credit; plus the system favoured 
some merchants over others. But it said that such fees contribute to technical and 
economic progress if they are public and objectively determined by cost mechanisms, 
assuming four conditions are met: distinguishing between debit and credit; setting for debit 
fees a fixed maximum per transaction limited to covering authorization and processing 
costs; limiting credit fees to cover costs of authorization, processing and fraud risk; and 
distinguishing between four types of purchases: by post, telephone, manual or Internet. 
 
However, these were more restrictive than those costs acknowledged in the same year 
(2003) by the Australian rules, reviewable every three years and subject to scrutiny of 
experts approved by the RBA: the processing of credit card transactions, verification, 
receipt and settlement; fraud; development and maintenance of fraud control systems; 
costs related to the authorization of transactions; telecommunications costs related to 
authorization; costs to the issuer for financing interest-free periods; direct staff costs 
related to credit cards; programs, machinery and computers; recruitment costs or third-
party outsourcing; internal expenses charged by other business units in relation to the 
activities of credit card and costs of sending invoices and cards. 
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In Spain, merchants and schemes appealed against the decision to the National High 
Court (Audiencia Nacional), and maintained their position until the following Government 
established an agreement. A resolution was approved on May 18, 2005 in the Congress of 
Deputies (Congreso de los Diputados) urging the Government to: "take the necessary 
measures in relation to card payments regarding interchange fees applied to them to 
ensure they meet the criteria of the resolutions of the Competition Tribunal (Resoluciones 
del Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia) of 11 April, 2005. The Ministries of Economy 
and Finance, and Industry, Tourism and Trade shall establish the necessary mechanisms 
to ensure transparency and information on the fees applied. " 
 
In this way Industry, Tourism and Trade set up an Agreement signed on December 2, 
2005 between merchants associations and card schemes on the fixing of multilateral 
interchange fees in card payments. The signatories were, for financial institutions, 
Servired, Sistema 4B and Euro 6000, and for the trade sector, ANGED (supermarkets), 
CECc (retail), AVAD (distance selling), CEHAT (hotels), CAAVE (travel agencies) and 
FEHR (catering). 
 
The agreement established a new multilateral system for setting interchange fees for the 
next five years, in which the following points can be highlighted:  
 
 The system is to be subject to the Competition Defense Service (Servicio de 
Defensa de la Competencia), "allowing the financial sector to undertake the 
necessary technology investments to expand the card payment system in its 
convergence with other EU countries and to improve its efficiency". 
 
 The agreement will especially benefit the commercial operators that bear higher 
rates. "This reduction in interchange fees is expected to lead to a decline in fees 
paid by merchants to banks (MSC) and ultimately translate into improved service 
and lower prices for the consumer."  
 
 "It provides for a transitional period of three years, between 2006 and 2008, for 
which a table of maximum fees to be respected by card schemes has been 
established. This will allow a study of costs, which can be used to calculate fees for 
the next two years. In any case, a guarantee clause is in place so that no merchant 
suffers higher fees than those currently experienced.” The maximum interchange 
fees in each year are shown in the Table 1 below: 
 
Table 1. Maximum Interchange Fees. Projected evolution 2006-2010 
 
 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 
2009-
2010 
2009-
2010 
Euros (€) Credit (%) Debit (€) Credit (%) Debit (€) Credit (%) Debit (€) Credit (%) Debit (€) 
0-100 mill. 1.40 0.53 1.30 0.47 1.10 0.40 0.79 0.35 
100 - 500 mill. 1.05 0.36 0.84 0.29 0.63 0.25 0.53 0.21 
> 500 mill. 0.66 0.27 0.66 0.25 0.54 0.21 0.45 0.18 
Source: Ministry of Industry 
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 The Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade has been requested by the parties 
involved to set up an observatory as a forum for the monitoring and dissemination 
of electronic payments in the commercial sector in Spain. Entities processing card 
payments pledged to endow a fund of three million euros over the period 2006-
2008, in order to disseminate and promote the use of cards as a method of 
payment, especially with small merchants. 
 
For the first three years (2006-2008), maximum fees were set and later were to be 
determined in relation to an audited costs analysis. This would be completed in July 2008, 
and if no agreement were reached then immediately identical fees would be applied. 
Intrasystem fees become dependent on the volume levels.  
 
For intersystem transactions, the maximum will be equal to the weighted intrasystem 
average plus the weighted average of interconnection costs in each of the systems, which 
is expressed as a fixed amount per transaction, but may not exceed a ceiling of six cents 
(0.06 euros). These reductions were expected to reduce the fees paid by merchants and 
also benefit the consumer - effects which are tested in this research. 
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4 Intervention in Spain: Effects and amounts by agents  
In this section we analyze the evidence of the intervention in Spain since the December 
2005 Agreement until the end of 2010 in the four-party system. During these five years the 
banking sector has gone from a situation of unprecedented growth – as has the payment 
card sector - to one that is much more restricted. The economic cycle has slowed activity 
in both electronic and cash payment methods, although in Spain the use of electronic 
payment has slowed further than the use of cash, in comparison with other countries that 
did not cut their interchange fees. 
 
4.1 Impact on the use of cards  
Before the Agreement the number of bank card transactions in Spain doubled every three 
or at most four years. After 2005 it took six years for debit card transactions to double and 
even longer for credit card transactions. The number of credit card transactions grew in the 
last six years from 743 million to 1,062 million, while those of debit and credit almost 
doubled, growing from 675 million in 2005 to 1,302 million in 2011, according to statistics 
from the Bank of Spain. The growth in card use in 2010 and 2011 was also conditioned by 
a restrictive credit policy implemented by financial institutions in 2009, as a result of the 
impact of the economic crisis 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of payment cards 2002-2010 
 
 
Source: Bank of Spain. Millions of cards (T. Crédito = Credit cards;T. Débito =Debit cards) 
 
However, the explanation lies not only in the international business cycle, since up to the 
end of 2008 Spain was one of the countries with the highest GDP growth among its 
neighbours.  It was also among those European countries with a lower level of 
development in payment cards and thus had a tremendous potential for growth.  
 
Among these variables can be highlighted the possibility of bridging the gap resulting from 
the fact that Spain is one of the European countries with a greater use of cash, which 
increased during the decade prior to 2009 as a result of the housing bubble and a larger 
underground economy linked to construction. This was true despite the fact that the 
Eurozone is the second largest area in the world for noncash payment methods, which 
amounted to 21% by volume in 2009, behind the 40% of the United States39. But Spain 
                                                        
39
 Capgemini, World Payments Report , 2011, p. 10. 
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barely reached 17% both in regards to this ratio as in the very similar in POS terminal 
payments with respect to total private consumption. 
 
Figure 3. Use of payment instruments in the euro area 
 
Source: ECB 2011, Statistical Data Warehouse. 
 
Despite being one of the main four or five major economic powers in Europe, Spain has 
not been among the countries with the greatest progress in noncash payment methods, 
neither in the peak years nor in the recession.  
 
Despite the strong monetization resulting from the introduction of the euro, during the 
decade 2000-2010 payment cards staged the largest absolute growth in the eurozone, 
attaining more than 20,000 million payments in 2010. The euro countries with the highest 
use of cards are Finland, Estonia, Netherlands and Luxembourg. 
 
In contrast, in Greece and Italy, as in Spain, payment cards obtained smaller increases in 
the number of transactions per capita. The greatest growth occurred in Estonia, Slovakia, 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Malta, countries which in adopting more recently the euro 
registered higher GDP growth rates. 
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Figure 4. A comparison of debit card transactions with credit card and deferred debit card 
transactions in the euro area 
 
Source: Statistical Data Warehouse, BCE: Towards an integrated European card payments market. Data for 
2000 are not available for Spain, Luxembourg and Slovakia.Note: For the table on the left data for Spain, 
Luxembourg and Slovakia are not available for the year 2000. ECB. Monthly Bulletin, January 2012. In the 
table on the right, the "sum of the components" is not equivalent to the "total" in all cases because while all 
countries provide data on total, not all provide data on the subgroups, for example France. 
 
In addition to these macro variables that should have led to broader comparative growth of 
card payments in the last decade, Spain experienced other favourable sociological and 
microeconomic conditions. Of the factors which are most influential in the choice between 
cash or card, the main one is age, and Spain currently has a population that is younger 
than the European average, as well as having the highest life expectancy. 
 
In Figure 5 below are the perceptions of insecurity40 and costs, followed by the perception 
of ease of use. In connection with the latter two, a large ATM network for the withdrawal of 
cash acts against card payments, while, on the contrary, a large POS terminal network has 
the opposite effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
40  
Card payments services cover operational, legal, financial and even systemic risks 
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Figure 5. Meta-analysis of 130 empirical surveys on the factors influencing the adoption and 
use of payment instruments 
 
Source: Data of the ECB. Monthly Bulletin, January 2012 
 
Consequently, intervention to reduce interchange fees has not allowed such potentials to 
function in favour of payment cards. The idea that this has been a causal factor stems 
from the fact that until 2005 there were structural changes that were stopped short 
precisely during the years of the Agreement (2006-2010). But it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to demonstrate a straightforward relationship with the reduction, apart from 
noting that the fees themselves remained almost frozen in the first year (2011) after the 
end of the agreement, when they depended only on the market rather than on regulation, 
as we shall see later. On the one hand, growth in the use of cards in 2010 and 2011 is 
conditioned by the restrictive credit policy implemented in 2009 due to the economic crisis. 
On the other, the fact that rates did not keep going down in 2011 is yet another cause of 
the growth in purchases made with cards. 
 
One of these structural changes prior to the Agreement was that the percentage growth of 
POS terminals had passed for the first time that of ATMs (leading to the greater cost of 
cash, in more common use in Spain). In 2005 Spain had a total of 57,000 ATMs and 
almost 62,000 at the start of the banking crisis. The number of ATMs (1.3 per thousand 
inhabitants, a third more than the UK) has increased since then, giving Spain a higher ratio 
of ATMs per population than any other European country;  likewise in terms of POS 
terminals (over 31 per million inhabitants ), double those of the most advanced European 
countries. 
 
Despite all this, the volume of transactions and the average per card were, after the 
Agreement, more affected than cash. The first is clearly shown in Table 2 below: the first 
year of the Agreement (2006) the growth rate of cash use went from 1.6% to 3%, while 
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cards (cheaper, faster, more convenient and more transparent) halted their advance from 
14% in 2003 and 2005 to 10.7%. In the recession of 2009 payment card use declined by 
3.5%, whereas the use of cash went down by only 2.9%, although it should be noted that 
in 2004-2005 payment card use grew at almost three times the rate of cash withdrawals. 
 
Table 2. Volume of purchase at terminals and cash withdrawals from Spanish ATMs 
 
 PURCHASE AT POS TERMINALS CASH WITHDRAWLS FROM SPANISH ATMS 
YEAR Transactions 
%  
interannual 
Amounts 
% 
Variation 
Transactions 
%  
interannual 
Amounts 
% 
Variation 
2002 991,564  46,828.92  899,075  82,024.59  
2003 1,070,162 7.93% 53,403.00 14.04% 923,126 2.68% 91,023.74 10.97% 
2004 1,235,093 15.41% 62,515.42 17.06% 942,503 2.10% 96,013.22 5.48% 
2005 1,372,055 11.09% 71,468.43 14.32% 957,561 1.60% 101,619.36 5.84% 
2006 1,571,046 14.50% 79,115.03 10.70% 986,399 3.01%, 107,976.41 6.26% 
2007 1,830,000 16.48% 89,395.89 12.99% 1,011,467 2.54% 113,936.79 5.52% 
2008 1,985,168 8.48% 94,413.92 5.61% 1,018,939 0.74% 116,555.44 2.30% 
2009 2,030,902 2.30% 91,075.50 -3.54% 988,827 -2.96% 113,196.09 -2.88% 
2010 2,149,184 5.82% 95,184.09 4.51% 987,458 -0.14% 114,161.80 0.85% 
2011 2,232,631 3.88% 98,267.79 3.24% 969,156 -1.85% 113,570.13 -0.52% 
Source: Bank of Spain and own sources. Transactions in thousands, and amounts in millions of euros. 
 
Similarly, the average transaction made with payment cards (the ratio between total 
volume of transactions and number of transactions) increased to a maximum of 52.1 euros 
in 2005, to fall steadily to 44.3 euros during the five years of the Agreement. In contrast, 
the average transaction at ATMs for cash increased from 91.2 euros to 117.2 euros during 
the same years (ratio of amounts and transactions).  
 
The banks attribute the increase in average cash withdrawals to the Bank of Spain rules 
on the communication of the commissions regarding cash withdrawals at ATMs. However, 
this trend is consistent with estimates of the increase of the cash-based underground 
economy. This is the case both in the years prior to the crisis and in the subsequent 
recession. Supporting this observation is that when in 2011 interchange fees stopped 
being lowered, volumes of payment cards again grew strongly while those of ATMs 
declined, despite the fact that the economic crisis affected both. 
 
Figure 6. Average transaction with payment cards 
 
 
  Source: Bank of Spain (in €) 
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Consequently, the end of the reduction of interchange fees in 2011 led to observations of 
two types of inefficiencies, attributed in the literature to two facts: for consumers and 
merchants, the greater cost of cash, increased by the use of ATMs, and for public 
administrations, lower tax revenue as a result of the growth of the underground economy. 
However, in relation to the added value created for the entire national economy, card 
purchases grew from 7.83% of GDP to 9.05% through 2005-2010. In addition, final 
consumption expenditure or household expenditure increased from 13.82% to 15.96%. But 
in view of the increased use of cash the conclusion of some41 cannot be confirmed in the 
sense that the income of consumers and merchants improved when interchange fees were 
reduced. More realistic seems their other conclusion about the existence of interchange 
fees below which social welfare decreases. 
 
Table 3. Purchases at POS terminals in € and % of GDP and private consumption 
 
 
 
Operations 
% 
Interannual 
variation 
(b) 
 
Amounts 
(millions) 
% 
Interannual 
variation 
 
Nominal 
GDP at 
market 
prices 
% 
GDP 
 
Final consumption in 
households (millions 
and %) 
2005 1,372,055 11.09% 71,468.4 14.32% 909,298 7.86% 517,107 13.82% 
2006 1,571,046 14.50% 79,115.0 10.70% 985,547 8.03% 557,460 14.19% 
2007 1,830,000 16.48% 89,395.9 12.99% 1,053,161 8.49% 595,099 15.02% 
2008 1,985,168 8.48% 94,413.9 5.61% 1,087,749 8.68% 612,339 15.42% 
2009 2,030,902 2.30% 91,075.5 -3.54% 1,047,831 8.69% 578,019 15.76% 
2010 2,149,184 5.82% 95,184.1 4.51% 1,051,342 9.05% 596,322 15.96% 
Source:  Bank of Spain, National Statistics Institute (INE) and own calculations. 
 
In any case, the use of payment cards in Spain is still low: less than 50 transactions per 
capita per year, compared to about 90 in the EU 15, nearly 190 in the U.S. and 350 in 
some other advanced countries. There are four factors which provoke opposite effects and 
which lead to data revealing apparently contradictory behaviours: 
 
1. The evolution of economic activity, very significant throughout the period, with 
a strong and positive growth until 2008, and an economic recession of 
particular note between 2009 and 2010, with a significant decline in the weight 
of household consumption on GDP of more than one point in 2009. 
 
2. The effects of increased fees on debit and credit cards, analyzed in the next 
section as a clear and logical reaction of banks to the reduction in interchange 
fees, with a series of negative impacts on the entire financial system and on 
commissions, fees, interest rates and payment card facilities and services. 
 
3. The special initial situation regarding payment cards in Spain, characterized by 
a much lower level of use than in many of the neighboring countries.  
 
                                                        
41
 Carbó Valverde, Santiago; Chakravorti, Sujit, and Rodríguez-Fernandez, Francisco., The Costs and Benefits of Interchange Fee Regulation: 
An Empirical Investigation, FRB de Chicago, Documento de Trabajo N º 2009-11 ( Preliminary version). 
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4. The extremely important growth of Internet commerce throughout this period, 
in which payment cards play a key role, which largely offset the negative 
effects of the economic cycle on payment cards, but not the effects of the 
increase of the submerged economy 
  
Between late 2005 and 2010, e-commerce using cards 42  increased from 1,547.7 to 
7,317.6 million euros, an increase of 472.8%. As in the same period total card transactions 
increased from 71,468.48 to 95,184.09 million, of which 23,715.66 million increase, 
5,769.9 million corresponded to electronic commerce: 24.3% of the total growth in bank 
cards since the entry into force of the Agreement. 
 
Although Spain is among the countries with a lower per capita use of cards (only 20 
payments, compared to 31 in the Eurozone), this may improve as the population ages: by 
age profile, 40% of clients under the age of 30 make purchases with payment cards, 
compared with 18% of users over 60. Hence the volume of POS terminal purchases 
shows a steady increase, only interrupted by the recession of 2009: after 2010 they 
exceeded the historical peak levels of 2008. 
 
Thus, despite the mentioned brake on total sales caused by the Agreement of 2005, the 
process of replacing cash with payment cards has continued. The advantages of cards 
over cash transactions are reflected in a dozen European studies over the past decade, 
mostly those of Central Banks (Dot-econ, 2011)43. But this substitution - also confirmed by 
the official data from Spain’s National Statistics Institute - was greater in the years prior to 
the Agreement of 2005, when sales at POS terminals increased each year between 0.8 
and 1 points in overall household consumption, then slowed but did not fall even in the 
recession of 2009, so that in 2010 these sales reached almost 16% compared to 13.8% in 
2005 and barely 11% at the beginning of the decade. 
 
4.2 Banking: reduction of fees and increase in commissions  
The application of the Agreement of 2005 reduced both the relative figures forecast as well 
as absolute figures of the two types of multilateral fees: the MSC, charged to merchants by 
banks and acquirers, and the interchange fees, paid by these to issuers. MSC were on 
average 1.52% of sales but dropped to 0.74% in late 2010. Interchange fees were 1.55% 
and declined to an average of 0.64%. In both cases, almost half of the entire reduction 
took place in the first year of the Agreement, 2006. Once the Agreement expired and the 
dynamics of the market were re-established, neither of the two rates changed in 2011, as 
both were left unregulated44.  
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 Comisión Nacional de Mercado de Telecomunicaciones. Informe sobre el comercio electrónico en España a través de entidades de medios 
de pago, IV Quarter, and Eurostat, Internet Usage in 2010 – Households and Individuals, nº 50/2010,  On average, 69% of EU 27 citizens are 
Internet users and 53% use the Internet almost every day, although only 8% of EU online shoppers buy from merchants in another country. 
According to a study by the European Commission 31 (Mystery Shopping Evaluation of Cross-Border E-Commerce in the EU - Final Report), 
60% of attempts to make credit card payments in cross-border shopping over the Internet are not successful owing to the rejection of Internet 
merchants to accept non-domestic credit cards. http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/EC_e-commerce_Final_Report_201009_en.pdf. 
See also Consumer 2020: From Digital Agenda to Digital Action, Report of the European Commission, 23 May 2010, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=750. 
43
 Dot-econ, (2011). Costly cash: a synthesis of international evidence on the cost of making payments. 
44
 Bank of Spain, Memorias anuales de supervisión 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011, and quarterly statistics of payment methods at 
www.bde.es These only offer averages of MSC, along with their minimums and maximum, but not interchange fees, even though in both cases 
they receive the published data of the three Spanish payment systems that signed the Agreement with the commercial sector. 
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Table 4. Turnover of POS Terminals and average MSC and interchange fees 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 TOTAL 
POS terminal 
purchases 
71,468.4 79,115.0 89,395.9 94,413.9 91,075.5 95,184.1 520,652.80 
MSC 1.52% 1.13% 1.02% 0.88% 0.81% 0.74%  
Interchange 
fees 
1.55% 0.94% 0.91% 0.81% 0.77% 0.64%  
Differences -0.03% 0.19% 0.11% 0.07% 0.04% 0.10%  
Source: Bank of Spain and own calculations. 
 
A first observation is that the decline in interchange fees was greater than that of the MSC, 
so we can see that the issuing bank’s income was reduced to the same degree compared 
with the acquiring bank. Revenues for the acquiring banks from interchange fees were 
slightly lower than fees transferred to the issuers (0.05 points less in 2004 and 0.03 points 
less in 2005). This "primary deficit" for acquiring entities rose in 2004 to 31.25 million euros 
and in 2005, the year of the Agreement, declined to 21.4 million euros as a result of 
discount revenue worth nearly 1,086 million and payments worth 1,107 million. But this 
corrected itself immediately. In the five years of the Agreement acquiring entities took in 
4,078.74 million euros from MSC, and of that amount paid to issuers 3,632.39 million in 
interchange fees, thus obtaining a surplus of 446.35 million to compensate the acquiring 
banks for their work 
 
Table 5. Banking revenue from fees 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TOTAL 
 2006-10 
MSC 1,086.32 893.999 911.838 830.84 737.71 704.362 4,078.74 
Interchange 
fees 
1,107.76 743.681 813.502 764.75 701.28 609.178 3,632.39 
Differences -21.44 150.317 98.335 66.089 36.429 95.183 446.35 
 
Source: Bank of Spain and own calculations (millions of €). 
 
Consequently, in addition to benefitting retailers, the greater reduction in interchange fees 
with respect to MSC has enabled acquiring banks to avoid a deficit that would have risen 
to 136.8. Without the Agreement, discounts paid by merchants (6,827.6 million) would 
have been throughout this period lower than those generated by interchange fees (6,962.4 
million). 
 
Table 6. Overall fees without the 2005 reduction (merchants savings) million € and % 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Savings 
Volume turnover 
 
71,468.43 79,115.03 89,395.89 94,413.92 91,075.50 95,184.09  
MSC 
 
1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52  
Income from MSC 
 
1,086.32 1,202.548 1,358.818 1,435.092 1,384.348 1,446.798 2,748.85 
Interchange fees 
 
1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55  
Income from 
Interchange Rates 
1,107.761 1,226.283 1,385.636 1,463.416 1,411.67 1475.353 3,329.96 
Source: Bank of Spain and own calculations. 
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4.2.1 Effects on acquiring banks and trade  
In keeping the rates of 2005, the acquiring entities would have made 2,748.85 million 
euros more from MSC, an amount that necessarily would have had to come from the 
commercial sector. On the other hand, acquiring banks would have had to pay issuers 
3,329.963 million, a figure greater by 581.113 million than the money brought in. Those 
2,748.85 million have been the savings for commerce as a result of the 2005 Agreement. 
  
The Agreement set a timetable for reductions of three types: 1) if the rates were 
intersystem or intrasystem (within or outside the network), 2) if the card was credit 
(percentage reduction) or debit (reduction in euros), and 3) by the expected turnover in 
two-sided contracts for each business with its accepting entities. The methodological 
objective was that, by substantially lowering interchange fees, the MSC would also go 
down. To differentiate between fees within or outside the system one should add to these 
the weighted average of interconnection costs, which despite being different, could be 
expressed as a fixed amount per transaction, up to a maximum of 0.06 euros. 
 
Under the agreed schedule (see Table 1), reductions in interchange fees by almost a half 
in five years would be greater in proportion to sales volume. As in Australia, where the 
transitional period ended in 2008, interchange fees were to be set according to an analysis 
of audited costs, to be completed in July 2008; in its absence, the fees were to be applied 
for the following two years (2009/2010.) The analysis was presented, but as the 
Administration reached no decision, in the following months the same rates as in 2008 
continued to be applied. Thus in 2009 the average discount rate barely fell from 0.88% to 
0.81%; likewise in 2010 (to 0.74%). The biggest fall was from 1.52% in 2005 to 0.88% in 
2008. 
 
A first conclusion is that, before the Agreement promoted by the Government, the MSC 
applied in the market hardly changed, as they would not even in 2011. In the three years 
prior to 2005 only the maximum rates fell, although these declines were offset by higher 
minimums. The average remained unchanged at 1.59% from 2002 to 2005. After this point 
the average declined during the five years of the Agreement by more than 50% (from 
1.52% to 0.74%). 
 
Table 7. Average MSC by sector 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Food superstores 0.54% 0.65% 0.71% 0.67% 0.56% 0.55% 0.50% 0.47% 0.44% 
Other superstores 1.63% 1.42% 1.37% 1.28% 0.77% 0.72% 0.63% 0.56% 0.50% 
Gas stations 0.68% 0.68% 0.70% 0.72% 0.70% 0.70% 0.69% 0.68% 0.65% 
Supermarkets 1.15% 1.20% 1.21% 1.21% 1.14% 1.08% 1.02% 0.95% 0.88% 
Travel agencies 1.57% 1.59% 1.59% 1.61% 0.93% 0.78% 0.75% 0.69% 0.68% 
Highways          2.32% 2.30% 1.89% 1.76% 1.80% 1.71% 1.68% 1.48% 1.34% 
Pharmacies 1.59% 1.52% 1.50% 1.46% 1.26% 1.16% 1.04% 0.93% 0.82% 
Hotels 1.83% 1.78% 1.75% 1.76% 1.41% 1.24% 1.09% 0.98% 0.91% 
Drugstores  2.21% 2.24% 2.17% 2.10% 1.45% 1.25% 1.09% 0.98% 0.91% 
Restaurants 2.43% 2.45% 2.42% 2.31% 1.68% 1.45% 1.25% 1.11% 1.00% 
Transportation 1.70% 1.79% 1.83% 1.82% 1.38% 1.02% 0.73% 0.72% 0.65% 
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Jewelry       2.51% 2.42% 2.31% 2.21% 1.49% 1.30% 1.12% 0.98% 0.90% 
Vehicle rental 2.48% 1.76% 1.67% 1.63% 1.37% 1.24% 1.11% 1.05% 0.99% 
Casinos        2.04% 2.10% 2.35% 2.08% 1.36% 1.21% 1.13% 1.07% 1.03% 
Leisure and 
Entertaiment 
1.82% 1.91% 1.87% 1.83% 1.51% 1.29% 1.15% 1.06% 0.94% 
 Post & Telephony 2.97% 2.77% 2.46% 2.46% 1.81% 1.51% 1.31% 1.10% 1.03% 
Massage, sauna, disco 3.48% 3.29% 3.02% 2.91% 2.33% 2.07% 1.79% 1.56% 1.37% 
Retail 1.58% 2.08% 2.19% 2.10% 1.47% 1.27% 1.09% 0.97% 0.88% 
Discount stores    1.77% 1.71% 1.59% 1.42% 1.35%  
Charities     0.61% 0.58% 0.49% 0.51% 0.43% 
Other business 1.96% 2.09% 1.98% 1.98% 1.58% 1.42% 1.15% 1.10% 0.99% 
Maximum 3.48% 3.29% 3.02% 2.91% 2.33% 2.07% 1.79% 1.56% 1.37% 
Minimun 0.54% 0.65% 0.70% 0.67% 0.56% 0.55% 0.49% 0.47% 0.43% 
Average 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 1.52% 1.13% 1.02% 0.88% 0.81% 0.74% 
Source: Bank of Spain. 
 
Consequently, the cross-transfers attributed by the economics literature were realized to a 
greater extent in the sectors that achieved lower maximum rates without increasing 
minimums, clearly correlated with those of interchange fees. Highways and gas stations, 
along with supermarkets and food, are the sectors that yield lower rates, while the greatest 
rates can be observed in the massage, sauna, discos, casinos and jewellery sectors. 
There was some convergence of maximum and minimum rates, respectively at around 
1.56% and 0.47%. The level of the variable decreased in addition to its variability. This 
implies a reduction in rank: the difference between minimums and maximums was 2.24 
points in 2005 and only 0.94 points in 2010. 
 
The decline fulfilled the objectives and demonstrated the instrumental nature of 
interchange fees. The agreed timetable ended with these at an average of 0.61% for credit 
cards, and 0.22 euros for debit cards within the same network. Between different 
networks, the respective mean values were 0.78% and 0.29 euros respectively. 
 
4.2.2 Responses of the issuing banks: control over the acquiring entities  
The issuing entities balanced these reductions in income in interchange fees received by 
the accepting banks with increases in almost all of their card commissions. Even credit 
card interest was raised, until it was checked and almost cancelled out by the recessive 
economic situation from 2008 onwards. Adding both, we estimate that revenues from 
banking cards were 2,929.5 million in 2005 and 3,096.15 million in 2010. 
 
These estimates are derived from the averages calculated and published by the Bank of 
Spain on the basis of data received from each entity. Although some entities declare  
commissions that they later condone or do not charge their clients, a practice that may 
have increased with the crisis, these estimates approximate not only to the fee reduction, 
but also to the increase in commissions estimated from actual revenues included in the 
profit and loss accounts of  the sector. 
 
Of course, other factors prevent attributing a causal relationship with the lowering of 
interchange rates and MSC. The impact of default on the cost of the cards, the increases 
added to the cost of bank financing, lack of liquidity and the requirements of higher capital 
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ratios on assets have also been other variables that have influenced the increase in 
commissions, as well as the launching of new services. 
 
While acquiring banks reduced the volume of interchange fees to the emitting entities by 
almost 500 million euros a year (from 1,107.76 in 2005 to 609.18 in 2010, according to 
Table 5) to offset the loss of up to nearly 400 million in MSC, net income for all types of 
fees and commissions barely changed. This was 2,268.03 million in 2005 and 2,136.78 in 
2010, according to our estimates based on data published by the Bank of Spain on its 
website and in its monthly statistical bulletins. Additionally, interest income increased from 
661.12 to almost 959.37 million in the same period. 
 
So, to compensate for lower earnings from interchange fees and MSC and other factors, 
banks and savings banks have more than doubled their additional revenue annually45. In 
the table below we consider the evolution of net fees and commissions on cards. Interest 
income from credit cards, in the absence until now of information from the Bank of Spain 
or other banking entities, has been estimated by exclusion, since in June 2010 statistical 
requirements regarding the types of interest charged by banks to their customers46 were 
amended and as a result were left out of credit card transactions. 
 
Table 8. Revenue from fees and bank card commissions (without interest) 
 
 Net Gross % Cards Net cards Gross cards 
2005 10904 13143 20.8% 2268.032 2733.744 
2006 12244 14519 17.4% 2130.456 2526.306 
2007 13594 16225 16.2% 2202.228 2628.450 
2008 13026 15555 16.9% 2201.394 2628.795 
2009 12163 14630 16.5% 2006.895 2413.950 
2010 11871 14415 18.0% 2136.780 2594.700 
Total    12945.785 15525.945 
Source: Bank of Spain and own calculations. The percentage of card’s income has been obtained from the 
information shown in Appendix No. 3. 
 
So then, for the first time it could be deduced that interest and commissions related to 
consumer credit cards totalled 2,137 million per year. This estimate could be derived from 
the fact that the average rate of consumer credit published in May 2010 was 6.98%.  
 
Given the sudden drop of 0.99 points solely as a result of this statistical change, we can 
see the cost of credit cards in terms of APR (annual percentage rate, amount of interest 
                                                        
45
 The only time the Spanish Banking Association broke down the data of card commissions was to present the accounts up to March 2009, 
concerning the worst year in recent decades. The most important of these commissions were and are still "marketing of non-banking 
products," such as mutual funds and pension plans, along with commissions of the "collection and payment services," most notably credit 
cards and debit cards, which nevertheless in the quarter reached 18% of all banks and savings banks commissions. See Corral de la Mata, 
Daniel (2009), Nuevo enfoque del negocio de tarjetas bancarias en el sistema español de medios de pago, Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y 
Sociales, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, doctoral thesis, p. 141 and after. 
46
 The Circular of the Bank of Spain 1/2010 of 27 January, modified Circular 4/2002 on interest rates applied by credit institutions to deposits 
and loans to households and non-financial entities, to adapt it to the changes introduced by Regulation (EC) 290/2009 of the European Central 
Bank of 31 March. The new Circular provides greater detail relative to new lending. This new information will begin to be published when 
sufficiently representative data series become available. In addition, the new Circular amends certain criteria that affect the classification and 
content of certain transactions, causing the resulting breaks in data series. Thus, the data series to May 2010 inclusive, which was called 
"Overdrafts", also includes, as of June 2010, credit lines and has been renamed "Overdrafts and credit lines" (previously credit lines were 
included along with other credit transactions). Moreover, in the case of credit lines, the new Circular considers the amount outstanding at the 
end of each month a "New transaction", and not the amount of credit granted in the month, as before. These changes are reflected in the data 
of interest rates and in the amount of the new concept “Overdrafts and credit lines”. Finally, the changes in the new Circular significantly affect 
the data of "Consumer credit up to a year" which, from the June 2010 data, does not include credit transactions by credit card. 
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and commissions) 47 . Distinguishing what part was from interest and what part for 
commissions can only be done by approximation. We estimate interest in 2010 as being 
almost 960 million, some 300 more than in 2005. 
 
Table 9. Revenue from consumer credit interest and cards 
 
 
Consumers credit 
 
Card fees Card financing Average rates 
Interest income 
from cards 
2005 84.354 12.50% 10,544.25 6.27%   661.12 
2006 104.445 13.10% 13,682.30 7.32% 1.001.54 
2007 114.462 14.50% 16,596.99 8.34% 1.384.19 
2008 110.092 14.70% 16,183.52 8.83% 1.429.01 
2009 110.101 14.50% 15,964.65 6.96% 1.111.14 
2010 107.916 14.00% 15,108.24 6.35%     959.37 
Source: Our estimation of credit series and rates of the Bank of Spain with assessments of rates carried out by 
various consultants. In the case of consumer accounts, both concepts - commissions and interest rates - 
should not lead to APRs greater than 250% of statutory interest (4% in 2005 and 2006, rising to 5% in 2007 
and 5.5% in 2008, up to 04.04.2009, when it returned to 4%, excluding specific rates derived from legal cases 
and late tax payments). 
 
This development altered the economic structure of bankcards, whose main source of 
income was trade and is now consumption. It has thus passed from an acquiring business 
to an issuing business. Various consultants and companies (Tatum48, DBK, Visa Europe, 
etc.) estimated at the beginning of 2006 that cards represented 12.5% of the amount of the 
funding balances of consumption in Spain. 40% were personal loans, another 22% single-
purpose loans and 25.5% were motor vehicles. But the biggest source of income was 
trade (around 37% of revenue), followed by interest income (26%) and fixed commissions 
(22%), and the rest ATMs or automatic sales, with 2% claims commissions, currency 
exchange, and so on. Following the Agreement, cards represented 14%49, reaching nearly 
15% before the recession in 2009, while weighted types of consumer credit (which rose 
during the recession from 7.56% to 7.77% and in January 2009 were 8.11%, to reach 
8.90% a year later), indicating an immediate tendency on the part of the financial entities 
to seek compensation for the reduction of MSC and interchange fees. Thus, for an issuing 
financial institution with a mixed business, if the 26% of financial income is added to that of 
the 22% of card fees (taking into account their recent increases), consumption accounts 
for more 50% of card revenue. 
 
The distortions have affected households on many fronts, by raising their outstanding card 
debts despite the reduction of the total volume of debts in the face of the scarcity of loans, 
in addition to curbing the demand for private consumption when it was needed to combat 
                                                        
47
 The exact definition provided by the Bank of Spain in its Monthly Statistical Bulletin is the "weighted average of all maturities, which equals 
the total cost of borrowing. This total cost comprises an interest rate component and a component of commissions." In some of these 
publications the BoS recognizes that these commissions are included in "other annual expenses." Thus the APR is differentiated from the 
NDER (narrowly defined effective rate), which equals the APR without including commissions. 
48
 Tatum,¿Cómo está evolucionando el negocio de los medios de pago?¿Por qué se ha reabierto la guerra de tarjetas? (How is the business 
of payment methods evolving? Why has the card war been restarted?), September, 2007 
http://www.tatum.es/publicaciones_consultapublicacion.asp?pmid=225   
49
 This 14% deduced from Bank of Spain statistics matches the data provided by the MasterCard Barometer published last November, 
according to which a credit card customer spends an average of 338 euros per month. 60% use their card once a month. The debit card holder 
spends 300 euros per month, using the card 3.23 times per month. Precisely for this cost growth one of the most striking facts of the study is 
the reduction of deferred payment with interest, which fell to pre-crisis levels: 14.1% opted for this type of payment, a figure similar to 2006 and 
36% less than the previous year. According to the study, Spanish customers say they increasingly use credit and debit cards for purchases in 
shops. The number of consumers reporting using debit cards has increased by 6.9% compared to 2010, reaching 77.2%. Also the number of 
consumers using credit card in stores has increased, reaching 84.8%. Finally, there is a tendency to finance an acquisition for amounts from 
about 100 to 300 euros. However, 40% never consider doing this. 
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the recession and interest rate policy was bearish. The Survey of Household Finances (La 
Encuesta Financiera de las Familias)50 prepared by the Bank of Spain every three years, 
indicates that between 2005 and 2008 families with credit card debt rose from 2% to 
7.3%51, although the percentage of those who had any kind of debt only rose from 49.5% 
to 50.1%. 
 
Table 10. Families with credit card debt according to employment 
 
 2005 2008 
Employed 3.2% 12.7% 
Self- Employed 1.1% 4.7% 
Retired 0.4% 1.9% 
Inactive - Unemployed 1.3% 3.9% 
Source: Based on data from the Bank of Spain. 
 
The new predominance of the issuing bank over the acquiring bank stems from when 
during the five years of the Agreement they increased their commissions for annual 
issuance fees and card renewal by 855 million euros,  from 1,116.7 million in 2005 to 
1,972.5 million in 2010. 
 
Table 11. Income from annual issuance and renewal fees 
 
 
Millions of cards  Annual fees (Millions €) 
Increase 
2005 2010 2005 2010 
Debit 31.83 28.62 353.949 495.126 141.176 
Credit 33.25 42.96 762.755 1,477.394 714.639 
Total 65.08 71.58 1,116.704 1,972.520 855.815 
Source: Bank of Spain and own calculations. 
 
These estimates and others are included in Table 8 in the net income of cards with 
interchange fees and MSC. They are consistent with those earlier, although they were 
estimated using another method: multiplying the number of cards by annual fees. Although 
Spanish law allows the institutions to set fees freely, each entity must include them in 
contracts signed with its customers and, in the case of card contracts, any change has to 
be communicated individually to each customer prior to its implementation. The Bank of 
Spain publishes maximum and minimum fees (although it does not provide information 
about the services charged) which enables us to estimate that the average annual fee for 
credit cards has grown from 22.94 euros in 2005 to 34.39 euros in 2010, an increase of 
11.45 euros, while the average fee for debit cards rose from 11.12 euros to 17.3 euros, an 
increase of less than 6.18 euros a year.  
 
                                                        
50
 The household financial survey is conducted with a sample of nearly 6,000 consumers (5,962). 72.4% state that for the year 2008 they had 
at least one credit card. But not all use them regularly: 59.39% state they use the cards for an average of 10.32 payment transactions per 
month, for an average total of 1,336.7euros per month. 
51
 Bank of Spain (Eurosistema), Boletín Económico 12/2010, p. 54 and 55. The EFF also includes information on other debts, besides those 
involving the purchase of principal residence and other real estate. The main reasons for contracting other debts are carrying out home 
improvements, investment in real estate assets, financing businesses and the purchase of vehicles and other durable goods. The types of debt 
that are contracted for these purposes are generally secured debts (including mortgage guarantees different from those used for the purchase 
of the main dwelling or other real estate), personal loans, credit card debt and other types. Specifically, lines of credit, deferred payment, 
advance payments, loans from family or friends, debit balances on current accounts, leasing or renting, and others that are not specified. 
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There are many other sources of bank income, which are as changeable as the services 
they provide, although less important. These are estimated in Table 8: the issuing bank 
receives interchange fees from the acquirer, but sometimes pays to the acquirer 
interchange fees of ATMs, which work in reverse. Other banking income involves the 
provision of cash credit at ATMs, fees for debt reclamation, currency exchange in cross-
border transactions, excess credit limits and many other commissions. For their part, as 
well as commissions from merchants (MSC, interchange fees ceded) and self-service fees 
(interchange fees received from ATMs), acquiring banks and saving banks apply fees for 
installation and maintenance of POS terminals, though some feel that this is less relevant 
in the Spanish market than in other countries. 
 
However, the above figures and those contained in the following sections on merchants 
and consumers are consistent with samples taken of commissions of the top five banks 
and savings banks (which account for most of the market) by the authors of this research 
in late 2005 and the end of 2011, as summarized in Appendix 3, as there are entities that 
charge up to one hundred and fifty different types of commissions52 related to payment 
cards. The main increases outside fixed quotas were in commission claims and foreign 
exchange. They had little impact on total revenue estimated above. But they are significant 
in that they had become widespread among banks at the end of the term of the Agreement 
of 2005. 
 
4.2.3 Controversy on cross-border fees  
In general, as indicated in the Seventh Status Report of SEPA, the position of the 
Eurosystem is neutral on interchange fees. This is a matter that falls within the remit of the 
European Commission, although it considers that if the SEPA project is to succeed it is 
essential that all countries in the eurozone can issue, acquire and use cards to make 
payments in euros without any geographical differentiation. But the fact is that euro notes 
and coins were successfully introduced in 2002, and the SEPA for electronic payments 
has not yet been set up. In this context one of the most important disputes lies in whether 
or not to regulate on the level and the alignment of cross-border interchange fees. 
 
This debate also focuses on the reason for the existence of interchange fees as a motor 
for other driving forces, such as innovation, transparency and control of payments, the 
struggle against the underground economy and the lower cost of cards compared with 
cash. Many agents believe, like most banks, that it is not necessary to align European 
fees, nor intra-regional or domestic fees. Carrying out such alignments without regard to, 
amongst other things, the various operating costs or interest rates or delays, for example, 
would create imbalances in the whole system and each of its parts, as described above in 
the case of Spain. Thus, the predominant idea is that a forced equality in interchange fees 
would have negative effects on the entire industry, the economy and society as a whole. 
 
The structure and level of interchange fees applied in different EU states differ 53 . 
Domestically, in many countries they were established bilaterally54 or multilaterally55  by 
                                                        
52
 On July 8, 2010 Order EHA/1608/2010 of 14 June (Orden EHA/1608/2010, de 14 de junio) entered into force, on transparency of conditions 
and requirements applicable to payment services, which in its second additional provision establishes that the transparency of payment 
services subject to Law 16/2009 of 13 November (Ley 16/2009, de 13 de noviembre) on payment services (transfers, arrears and direct debits, 
current accounts and savings and card transactions), shall be governed exclusively by its provisions and not by the Order of December 12, 
1989 on interest rates and fees, rules of conduct, information to clients and advertising of credit institutions, which was previously in force. 
53
 Börestam , Ann and Schmiedel, Heiko, Interchange fees in card payment,  European Central Bank, Occasional paper series no. 131/ 
September, 2011.  
54
 Bilateral interchange fee: a rate of exchange agreed between two parties in a system to process payment card transactions, only for 
payments between these parties in relation to transactions within this system 
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payment card schemes. Most countries without a domestic operator allow Visa Europe 
and MasterCard to provide the service. At the cross-border level, Visa Europe and 
MasterCard also set the default interchange fees applicable in the domestic market if there 
are no bilateral or multilateral agreements. But for more than a decade the European 
Commission and some national regulators have acknowledged that this affects 
competition. The debate is whether there are agreements or decisions between 
companies or associations, who are abusing their dominant position. The Commission has 
stated that this is the case and the Court of First Instance in Luxembourg ratified this in 
May 2012. Now this will be debated at higher instance courts if MasterCard decides to 
appeal. 
 
These cross-border interchange fees have been reduced by various administrative and 
judicial decisions (Case No. COMP/29.373 56  and No. COMP/34.579 MasterCard, 
COMP/36.518 Euro Commerce and COMP/38.580 business cards) 57 . Visa gradually 
reduced them to 0.7% in 2007 for deferred debit and credit cards with the immediate effect 
for debit of 0.28 euros58. But in April 2009, the Commission insisted, and in April 2010, 
Visa agreed to cut rates further by 0.2% for debit over a period of four years, and in 
December 2010 the Commission made this legally binding for four years59 . A similar 
situation affected MasterCard from June 2006; it was declared anti-competitive in 
December 2007 and it appealed to the Court of First Instance60, after which it reached an 
agreement with the European Commission pending the decision to reduce interchange 
fees by 0.3% for credit cards and 0.2% for debit cards. 
 
Table 12. Comparison of cross-border fees 2005 - 2010 
 
 Cross-border (AEE) 
Year Visa MasterCard 
2005 
Credits 
0.70% 1.90% 
Debit 
0.28€ 0.75% 
2010 
Credit 
0.70% 0.30% 
Debit 
0.2% December 0.20% 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The most noteworthy aspect of this controversy is that, if guidelines imposed by the 
European Commission on Visa and MasterCard are re-established, as well as 
recommendations made to various governments, domestic interchange fees should tend in 
the next few years to hold at levels imposed by Brussels for cross-border fees, which are 
                                                                                                                                                                         
55
 Multilateral interchange fee: an exchange rate that is determined by the processing system for payment card transactions and which applies 
to transactions in the system to members in the absence of a bilateral agreement. 
56
 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_29373 
57
 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_34579   
58
 It is not possible to disclose the levels of the multilateral interchange fees (MIF)  in force prior to the agreement of these reductions, since 
Visa considers them a trade secret; however, Visa estimated that the effect of the changes (including debit, deferred debit and credit cards) on 
income earned by the issuing banks thanks to the MIF on cross-border transactions meant a decline in such revenues of more than 20% over 
the five year period 2002-2007. 
59
 Decision of the Commission of 8 December 2010 on procedures under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.398 - Visa MIF). 
60
 Since the 1st December 2009 the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
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comparatively the lowest in the world: around 0.30% on credit cards and 0.20% for debit 
cards. Because of the increasing dominance of the former, over the next few years of 
enforced convergence a weighted average of close to at least 0.28% should be reached, 
less than half the 0.64% imposed in Spain by the 2005 Agreement. We estimate that this 
would represent an additional income reduction for issuing banks of another 370 million 
euros a year until the end of the process. If what has been found in this research is 
repeated, given the resistance of merchants to assume that extra cost, banks and savings 
banks will be obliged to accept lower profits or losses if they cannot offset these lower 
revenues with larger increases in commissions and higher interest rates for consumers, 
with all the other associated negative effects for the system as a whole, the economy and 
European society in general. That is, it will further upset the balance of remunerations of 
the four-party system, accentuating the distortions and disincentives introduced therein by 
the Agreement of 2005. 
 
We have said that banks would be forced to accept losses or lower profits as the result of 
reduced income from interchange fees, because the difficulty of passing this on to clients 
(consumers or merchants) has increased during the current crisis. A detailed analysis of 
recent trends in their profit and loss accounts shows that such a policy in Spain is showing 
symptoms of exhaustion, just when the need to seek new resources to offset the rising 
cost of its liabilities is at its greatest; hence the spread of the "no commission" policy 
already launched by leading entities. 
 
There are two basic reasons for this change in the making. In addition to the fact that the 
draft circular on transparency of banking services will force banks to disclose not only the 
brochures but the fees actually charged (as prescribed in Section 13 of the document 
circulated by the Bank of Spain), their profit and loss accounts during the current crisis 
show that banks have been left without margins to compensate via fees for the drop in 
product revenue. For the entire banking system this drop is around 50,000 million euros 
per year (from 147,000 in 2008 to 87,000 million in 2011), equivalent to 5% of the Spanish 
GDP. The amount of this fall in financial revenues is almost double total staff costs. Every 
day banks find it more difficult to compensate for this by reducing financial costs and fees, 
since from 2011 the average cost of liabilities stopped falling and began to increase 
dramatically because of the rise of the Spanish risk premium, which derives its bank risk 
from sovereign risk, a process whose limitation is today one of the priorities of European 
institutions. 
 
Table 13. The crisis reduces the benefits of banking by 90% 
 
RESULTS OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 2008 TO 2011 (a) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Financial products 147,846 107,344 80,401 87,693 
Financial costs  –110,237 –61,819 –43,920 –55,661 
Interest Margin (MI)  37,609 45,525 36,481 32,032 
Comissions (net)  13,823 13,017 12,721 12,428 
Service charges and payments (net) 6,456 5,866 5,447 5,298 
Servicio de valores (revenue)  1,306 1,193 1,305 1,417 
Non-banking products (revenue) 3,899 3,170 3,325 3,248 
Liabilities and commitments (net)  1,603 1,651 1,757 1,797 
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Foreign exchange (revenue)   58 47 51 56 
Other comissions (net)  501 1,091 836 612 
GROSS MARGIN  70,048 70,990 66,430 59,318 
Administration costs –28,612 –28,200 –28,311 –27,603 
Staff costs  –18,504 –18,258 –18,201 –17,534 
PRE-TAX PROFIT   20,266 14,821 10,201 –582 
Income tax  –1,850 –1,466 –296 2,485 
INCOME 18,351 13,310 9,875 1,881 
Average return on earning assets (%) 5.58 3.9 2.9 3.22 
Average cost of onerous liabilities    4.19 2.27 1.61 2.06 
Return on average equity 10.93 7.25 5.27 0.95 
 
Source: Bank of Spain. Data available at April 20, 2012. (a) Data in this table refer to institutions active at some 
time in 2011. The structure of the table and the data have been prepared in accordance with the CBE 6/2008 
of November 26, amending the CBE 4/2004 of 22 December on standards of public and private financial 
information, and models of financial statements. 
 
 
4.3 Effect of the reduction of MSC on merchants 
The fundamental rationale used by the authorities to reduce the merchant service charge 
by lowering interchange fees was that it would benefit consumers through lower prices and 
improved quality of services provided by the merchants. The empirical evidence denies 
such causal relationships. 
 
The economic crisis has certainly driven down some prices since 2008, by causing sharp 
declines in domestic demand, both in consumption and investment. Unemployment, 
moderation of income and the impact of poverty on real estate valuations, combined with 
negative expectations, have affected private consumption, an effect aggravated by the 
raising of VAT in July 2010. Given all this, retailers, especially of clothing, footwear, 
household items and furniture, have implemented large price discounts, as also have as 
travel agents. Such transactions are generally paid with credit cards. 
 
It is therefore very difficult, a priori, to strictly separate the drop in prices caused by falling 
demand and that which corresponds to the reduction of MSC. To overcome this 
quantitative difficulty, and in the absence of relevant statistics, we designed a survey that 
sought to study in depth the final impact on consumers. The form is shown in Appendix 4. 
However, given the low response rate and lack of representativeness, the results have in 
the end not been used. 
 
Therefore, the only data available are those shown in Table 6; business has saved 
2,748.85 million as a result of the Agreement of 2005, without any empirical evidence 
indicating that these savings have translated into an improvement in the quality of service. 
But there is evidence, on the other hand, that business itself has suffered the 
compensatory reactions of the banks to protect itself from the fall in income, although with 
little impact overall: there have been substantial increases by the acquiring banks in the 
fees for installation and maintenance of POS terminals. Table 14 below shows the 
commissions declared by the most important entities. There is no data on actual receipt or 
remission of fees. 
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Table 14. Fees charged to merchants for POS terminals (in €) 
 
 2005 2011 
Bank 1 
Installation or set up of POS terminal 50 200 
Maintenance of bank property/month 5 (quarterly) 50 
Rental of portable POS terminal 50 50 
Bank 2 
Initial fee 300 300 
Billing equal to or more than 300 € or 10 transactions*/month - POS terminal  15 
Fixed/month - POS terminal 25  
Potable/month - POS terminal 50  
Saving Bank 1 
Installation or set up of POS terminal 60.1 150 
Billing equal to or more than 300 euros or 10 transactions/month – POS 
terminal 
20 20 
Billing less than 300 euros or 10 op/month - POS terminal 40 40 
Portable / month - POS terminal  30 
Portable 48.08 50 
Saving Bank 2 
Installation or set up of POS terminal 300.51 300.5 
Maintenance of bank property/month 60.1 61 
Management of transactions charges   
Bank 3   
Maintenance / year 120 120 
Rental of portable POS terminal/month 30.05 30.05 
Source: Based on data provided by banks to the Bank of Spain. 
 
Evans and Mateus (2011)61, who estimate the impact on consumers of the reduction of 
interchange fees in Europe, endorse these findings. They point out that according to both 
economic theory and empirical evidence, in highly competitive industries with constant 
returns to scale, firms transfer 100% of changes in costs to consumers. However, in other 
situations, as in the case of Spain, this percentage depends on market structure, demand, 
costs and the nature of the competition. 
 
In the card payment market, when interchange fees go down, costs tend to decline as well. 
The question to address is how to pass on to consumers the cost savings in interchange 
fees for the acquiring bank. We have seen that in the five years of the Agreement, these 
total savings (3,330 million) were higher than those from the MSC (2,749 million), so there 
would have been a margin of almost 500 million to pass on to business, and therefore to 
consumers. But so as not to save so many costs the acquiring Spanish banks even 
increased fees of such minor impact as those applied to POS terminals. 
 
                                                        
61
 Evans, S. D and Mateus, A, How changes in payment card interchange fees affect consumers fees and merchant prices: an economic 
analysis with applications to the European Union, 2011,. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1878735 
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In any case it is already been noted in the literature that that theoretical transfer is not 
necessarily produced in the same amount. The reason is that merchants generally have 
access to few acquiring banks. However, some merchants are large companies with a 
significant sales volume in their respective sectors. These can exert significant buying 
power, so that the negotiation of MSC and commissions changes proportionate with 
interchange fees. In the case of small merchants, economic theory suggests that, a priori, 
acquiring banks would transfer only a portion of the cost savings to the MSC paid by small 
and medium merchants. This seems to have happened in the light of the results shown in 
Table 6. 
 
It is even more complex to try to estimate what percentage of the reduction of interchange 
fees has an impact on the final price paid by consumers. In fact, it depends not only on the 
sectors – for example, the hospitality industry is more competitive than the supermarket 
sector, where the offer is smaller - but also on companies in the sectors themselves, in 
terms of the strategies they adopt, such as differentiation. Studies conducted in Europe 
estimate a 50% variation in MSC in the long run. Evan’s and Mateus’ conclusions 
regarding merchants are: 
 
a) Merchants would be able to obtain from acquiring entities less than 100% of the 
reduction of interchange fees. Those with more business could get 100%, while 
smaller ones would get less than 100%. 
 
b) Merchants would not immediately reduce prices paid by consumers, given that this 
reduction would be insignificant in certain transactions. 
 
In the case of Spain, given the low incidence of the reduction in the MSC in the average 
card transaction, everything indicates that there has been no reduction whatsoever passed 
on from merchant to consumer. We must also bear in mind that the average card 
transaction was 52.1 euros in 2005 and 44.3 euros in 2011. Thus, the total reduction for 
each transaction in this period was 40 cents, that is, about five cents a year. This signifies 
a minimum percentage of the rate reduction on the price - almost negligible - so that as a 
result of this there would be no discount on the price. 
 
The refusal of most merchants associations to respond, as well as their contradictory 
answers, make it clear that the reduction in interchange fees has had no impact on final 
prices: it has not been passed on to customers. 
 
4.4 Effects on consumers  
Besides the data given above and which we will now develop regarding sharp increases  
of commissions and increased card interest costs, the qualitative methods we use to 
contrast all this data also endorses the failure of the basic objective of the Agreement of 
2005: that the fall in interchange fees would benefit consumers in terms of prices and 
quality.  
 
4.4.1 Survey of Consumers and Users Associations 
We conducted interviews among the most representative consumer and users 
organizations at a national level. We contacted twelve organizations, of which seven 
replied, all from the National Council of Consumers and Users. After explaining the 
context, we posed the following questions: 
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1. Do you think that the business sector has reduced the prices of its products or 
services and/or improved their quality as a result of the reduction in interchange 
fees over the period 2006-2010? 
 
2. Do you think that there was a greater display of technological development in 
electronic card payments over the period 2006-2010? 
 
3. Have you seen an increase in maintenance fees of credit and debit cards charged 
by banks to users during this period? 
 
4. Do you think rewards attaching to payment cards such as points, insurance, 
discounts, promotions, etc. have fallen, have remained steady, or have increased 
during this period? 
 
5. Do you think that there has been an improvement in competition in payment cards 
as a result of the Agreement? 
 
The findings of the interviews reveal that all the consumer organizations have a similar 
perspective in most areas, as well as being up to date with events, as the following 
summary of responses suggests: 
 
1. All are fully agreed that the reductions in interchange fees have not been passed 
on to consumers. Nor do they identify any decline or improvement in the services 
provided by the commercial sector as a result of lower MSC. Also they consider 
that the maintaining of prices is only and exclusively due to the effects of the 
economic crisis of the last two years. 
 
2. As regards technological development in electronic payments, all agree that there 
has been minimal innovation, and whatever innovation there has been is linked to 
issues of security in electronic transactions, such as the introduction of chip 
payment cards. Security, on the other hand, is already guaranteed or by the 
brands. 
 
3. With respect to an increase in annual payment card fees, all the consumer and 
user organizations maintain that there has been a significant increase, with some 
increases being branded as “exaggerated”. 
 
4. With reference to rewards, special offers and promotions, the general opinion is 
that these have not increased. In contrast, most consider them poorer than before. 
Marketing and advertising are felt to have increased, but only to win more 
customers. 
 
5. Finally, the majority considers that there has been no improvement of competition. 
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Table 15. Summary of responses from consumer organizations 
 
 
Price reduction 
/ Improvement 
of services 
provided by 
merchants 
Technological 
development 
Increase in annual 
card fees 
Increase of 
rewards 
Improvement of 
competition 
A
D
IC
A
E
 
 
No positive 
effects on trade 
to the 
consumer. They 
have neither 
lowered prices 
nor improved 
services. 
 
The 
Agreement 
was for 
nothing. Chips 
cards were 
brought in, 
promoted by 
the EC 
(SEPA). 
 
 
Clear increase in card 
fees due to lower 
interchange fees. 
 
Not observed. 
Increase in 
marketing and 
advertising, with 
lower fees and flat 
rates to preferred 
customers. 
 
 
Weak, rather 
restricted banking 
competition. This 
has worsened the 
situation of 
consumers. 
C
E
A
C
C
U
 
 
Neither a 
lowering of 
prices nor an 
improvement in 
services. The 
crisis has 
caused a 
reduction in 
prices. 
 
 
If there was 
anything it was 
minimal and it 
is not 
perceived as 
having 
improved 
competition. 
 
An increase, though 
with preferential 
treatment offered to 
some clients. Recent 
increases of 4% and 
9% in debt on credit. 
But 34% in credit and 
7% in debit in ATMs 
from the network. 
 
These are 
maintained to 
retain customer 
loyalty and sell 
other products 
 
Neither better, nor 
worse. Operators 
stay the same, 
without passing 
on competitive 
benefits to 
consumers. 
C
E
C
U
 
 
No passing on 
of reductions in 
interchange 
fees or MSC to 
consumers. 
Neither a 
lowering of 
prices nor an 
improvement in 
services. 
 
 
Some 
improvements 
such as micro-
chip cards and 
better 
terminals, but 
only for 
security 
reasons. 
 
A widespread 
increase in annual 
card fees paid by 
consumers. 
 
Some 
improvements are 
identified in 
promotional 
benefits from the 
use of cards 
 
There are new 
cards. The market 
is more 
competitive and 
diversified. 
H
IS
P
A
C
O
O
P
 
 
Neither a 
lowering of 
prices nor an 
improvement in 
services. 
 
Introduction of 
chip cards, but 
no other 
developments. 
Only an 
improvement 
in security. 
 
Increased 
commissions. 
Transfer of 
interchange fees to 
annual fees paid by 
consumers. The 
organization 
recommends using 
cards as little as 
possible in times of 
crisis.  
 
 
Reductions of 
10% -8% in 
discounts. Loyalty 
cards must meet 
certain 
requirements that 
reduce their 
advantages. 
 
Not improved: 
operators remain 
the same. 
F
A
C
U
A
 
 
There has been 
no fall in prices 
as a result of 
the drop in 
interchange 
fees. Prices 
have fallen due 
to the crisis. 
 
Progress has 
been relatively 
slight and this 
is not linked to 
the facilitation 
of transactions. 
 
No conclusive data 
are available, but 
users are more 
dissatisfied and there 
are more complaints 
concerning increased 
fees 
 
Not very relevant, 
more as marketing 
and business 
strategy.  It has 
not changed and 
there may be a 
lack of better 
deals. 
 
Users do not see 
it, and believe that 
behaviour has not 
changed. Few 
offers are 
transferred to the 
consumer, but a 
lot of products 
are. 
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F
U
C
I 
 
Prices have 
risen and 
consumers are 
conscious of 
this. Lowering 
of fees has not 
been passed on 
to consumers.  
 
 
No 
technological 
improvements 
and we are 
behind in 
security 
issues. 
 
Strong increase, that 
in some instances 
have reached 600%  
 
Few if no 
promotions; they 
are common and 
have lost their 
value because of 
their lower quality. 
 
As consumers it is 
something we are 
unaware of and 
we believe it is the 
traders who 
should know 
about this. 
O
C
U
 
 
Benefits of the 
reduction in 
interchange 
fees have not 
been passed on 
to consumers – 
on the contrary. 
Neither a 
lowering of 
prices nor an 
improvement in 
services. 
 
 
The only 
improvement 
has been the 
chip. The 
magnetic strip 
is maintained, 
with the 
security risk it 
entails. 
 
Card fees have 
increased in an 
exaggerated way. 
 
They have not 
improved. 
 
Competition in the 
sector has not 
improved. No new 
card issuers have 
entered the 
Spanish market 
Source: Own calculations based on surveys of each organization. 
 
4.4.2 Estimations derived from commissions brochures 
The estimations derived from commissions brochures of each bank published by the Bank 
of Spain are more categorical when they quantify the increase in fees paid by consumers. 
The issuing fee average for credit cards went from 22.94 euros to 34.39 euros for credit 
cards, an increase of 11.45 euros62. If the average fee is multiplied by the number of credit 
cards we can see that there has been a steady increase in the cost for consumers, up 
from €171 million in 2006 to €492 million in 2010. Only the cumulative sum of this fee for 
credit cards reaches €1,727.844 million. 
 
 
Table 16. Average annual fees and simulated revenue for credit cards (in millons €) 
 
 
Annual fees: 
CREDIT CARDS* 
Millions of 
cards 
Annual 
revenue* 
 
Fee 
revenue 
2005* 
 
Difference 
(A) - (B)* 
 Average Maximum Minimum  (A) (B)  
2005 22.94 35 13.52 33.25 762.755 - - 
2006 27.39 40 13.52 38.49 1054.241 882.961 171.281 
2007 28.43 40 13.52 43.49 1236.421 997.661 238.760 
2008 31.25 47 13.52 44.82 1400.625 1028.171 372.454 
2009 33.30 47 13.52 43.77 1457.541 1004.084 453.457 
2010 34.39 47 13.52 42.96 1477.394 985.502 491.892 
Source: Bank of Spain (fees to December) and own calculations.                                *Millions 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
62
 This increase in annual credit card fees has not stopped. As a curiosity, as of 2011 the average fee stands at 37.71 euros per card, that is, 
the average fee at this date is greater than the maximum credit card fee that was paid prior to the Agreement in December 2005, which was 
€35. 
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Using the same type of analysis, the increase in annual average fees for debit cards has 
been 55.57%: from 11.12 euros to 17.30 euros per card, an increase of 6.18 euros on 
average63. It has increased the total cost to consumers during the period by another € 
622.230 million. 
 
Table 17. Average annual fees and increases in debit cards 
 
 
Annual fees: 
DEBIT CARDS 
Millions of 
cards 
Annual 
revenue* 
Fee 
revenue 
2005 
Difference 
(A) - (B) * 
 Average Maximum Minimum  (A) (B)  
2005 11.12 18 4.51 31.83 353.972 - - 
2006 13.21 20 4.51 31.58 417.172 351.170 66.002 
2007 13.71 20 4.51 31.47 431.454 349.946 81.507 
2008 15.16 23 4.51 31.57 478.601 351.058 127.543 
2009 16.66 25 4.51 30.74 512.128 341.829 170.300 
2010 17.30 25 4.51 28.62 495.143 318.266 176.878 
Source: Bank of Spain (fees to December) and own calculations.                                *Millions 
 
Besides, we would have to add the effects of increases in other fees and interest rates, 
discussed in the section on issuing banks. Therefore, it is rather clear that consumers are 
the worst affected for the 2005 Agreement, and there is no evidence to suggest that either 
price or service benefits have been transfer to the consumer. Also competition has not 
improved at all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
63
 As we pointed out with regard to annual credit card fees, the evolution of annual debit cards fees has not stopped. It is interesting to note 
that, as of November 2011 the average fee stands at €20.25 per card; that is, the average fee at this date is greater than the maximum debit 
card fee that was paid prior to the Agreement of December 2005, which was €18. But it is also greater than the maximum fee paid by 
consumers in December 2006 and 2007. 
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5 Summary of conclusions and key findings 
On 2 December 2005, a government-enforced Agreement to reduce Interchange levels for 
a five year period (2006-2010) was signed by the main Spanish merchant associations 
and card schemes. The main results of the mandated Agreement were: 
 A 58.7% average reduction in Interchange. 
 The interchange reduction amounted to €3.329 bn in absolute numbers over the five 
year period. 
 The interchange reduction lead to a 51.3% average reduction of Merchant Service 
Charges (MSC), the fees merchants pay for card acceptance. 
 The MSC reduction amounted to €2.749 bn in absolute numbers over the five year 
period. 
 An increase of consumer cost (annual card fees) by 50%, amounting to €2.350 bn 
over the five year period of the study. 
 
The reduction in interchange has clearly harmed consumers by raising cardholder 
fees and reducing card benefits 
 
 Faced with a €3.329 bn shortfall of funds covering the costs related to providing 
card services as a result of reduced interchange, card issuers have been forced to 
compensate for this amount that merchants previously paid by increasing 
cardholder fees.   
 
 Consumers have had to bear more than a 50% increase in annual fees for 
standard four-party payment cards. The additional cost to consumers amounts to 
€2.350 bn over the five year period of the Agreement. Other fees have also been 
increased, such as those charged to consumers for overdrafts and debt claims. 
Additionally, consumers have seen their card rewards and promotions reduced, 
and also have had to pay more for these reduced benefits. 
 
There is no evidence that consumers have benefitted from lower prices following 
the reduction of interchange fees  
 
 The main beneficiaries of the interchange reduction have been merchants. Spanish 
merchants have received a MSC reduction of €2.749 bn during this five-year 
period.  
 
 Furthermore, there is no evidence in official statistics, surveys and interviews, that 
even a fraction of this cost saving has been passed on to consumers via reduced 
prices or through an improvement of the services provided. 
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The Agreement has altered the four-party system, affecting competition and has not 
encouraged innovation. 
 
 The obligation to reduce Interchange has altered the balance of the four-party 
system and negatively impacted its ability to compete with three-party systems, 
disturbing the competitiveness of the Spanish card payments market. 
 
1. The lowering of interchange fees, combined with a reduction in competition, has 
reduced incentives for innovation, critical for ensuring payment security and for 
fighting fraud, and also competition has not improved at all. 
 
  
The Agreement has slowed down cash displacement 
 
 The intervention has slowed the pace of displacement of costly cash by more 
efficient electronic means of payment, making it much harder to control the black-
market economy. 
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